Recent Cases by Bernstein, Charles S, et al.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 3 Issue 2 Article 9 
12-1950 
Recent Cases 
Charles S, Bernstein 
Arthur M. Erwin 
R. E. Grayson 
Malcolm E. Rentz 
H. P. Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bernstein, Charles S,; Erwin, Arthur M.; Grayson, R. E.; Rentz, Malcolm E.; and Smith, H. P. (1950) "Recent 
Cases," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol3/iss2/9 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - SELF INCRIMINATION - Admission of
Evidence of Blood Test Taken Without Defendant's Consent.
Defendant was convicted of assault and battery with intent to ravish.
The prosecutrix had bitten the finger of her assailant during the
struggle and the cut had left bloodstains in the automobile where
the assault occurred. A sample of defendant's blood was taken with-
out his consent and admitted as evidence. On appeal, HELD, af-
firmed. A sample of blood taken without defendant's consent and
admitted as evidence is not a violation of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. Commonwealth v. Statti, . Pa. ., 73
A. 2d 688 (1950).
In all criminal prosecutions the accused cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself. PA. CONsT. ART. I, § 9. The main
purpose of the self-incrimination provision was to prohibit the com-
pulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial for
the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations impli-
cating them in crime. People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E.
1003 (1894). The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not as an
exclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Holt v.
U. S., 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910). It is
the employment of legal process to extract from a person's own lips
an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of other evi-
dence. It is not merely any and every compulsion that is the kernal
of the privilege, but testimonial compulsion. 8 WIGMOlZ, EVmINcE
§ 2261 (3rd ed. 1940). There is a direct conflict of authority on
whether or not the constitutional provisions include immunity from
physical or mental examinations obtained without defendant's con-
sent. One line of authority as shown by the preceding has held
that the constitutional provisions protect only oral testimony. An-
other view has been taken that the constitutional immunity from self-
incrimination is not limited to testimonial compulsion, and that the
demonstration by an act required of a defendant which tends to self-
incrimination is as obnoxious to the immunity guaranteed by the
constitution as one by works. Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1941). South Carolina has apparently
chosen to follow the latter view,* while Pennsylvania is in accord
OSee cases cited in 1 S. C. L. Q. 199 (1948).
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with the former. State v. Taylor, 213 S. C. 330, 49 S. E. 2d 289
(1948). Those jurisdictions which follow the liberal view have held
to it consistently. It has been held that it is proper to ask a wit-
ness to look around the court room and point out the person who
committed the offense. State v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 64 (1872).
There was no violation of immunity from self-incrimination where
the accused was forcibly compelled to stand up for identification.
People v. Gardner, supra. Nor where the prisoner was made to stand
and repeat certain words. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. St.
369, 9 Atl. 78 (1887). Contra, State v. Taylor, supra. Neither was
there a violation of immunity from self-incrimination where testi-
mony was admitted as to the fit of a blouse that the defendant had
been made to put on. Holt v. U. S., supra. Appellant was not un-
constitutionally deprived of the right against self-incrimination when
he was made to stand with a handkerchief over his face. Ross v.
State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865 (1932). The examination of
scars on defendant would not be a violation of his protection from
self-incrimination. State v. Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354, 60 S. W. 743
(1900). The taking of defendant's finger prints is not self-incrimi-
nation. People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915 (1917). Removal of ma-
terial from under defendant's fingernails, over his objections, in
order to ascertain whether they contained human blood does not
violate a constitutional right of the defendant. State v. McLaughlin,
138 La. 958, 70 So. 925 (1916). Admittance of evidence concern-
ing narcotic contents pumped from defendant's stomach did not vio-
late his privilege against self-incrimination. People v. One Mercury
Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 168 P. 2d 443 (1946). It was held
that the fluoroscoping and giving of an enema to a 'defendant in
order to obtain rings which he had swallowed was not a violation
of the self-incrimination clause. Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 420,
141 S. W. 2d 341 (1940). But see Apodaca v. State, supra. Where
defendant was made to submit to a blood test and a urinalysis to
determine the amount of alcohol in his system, it did not contravene
his constitutional right not to be compelled to give evidence himself.
State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E. 2d 265 (1938).
The Pennsylvania Court having been committed to follow the
doctrine that immunity from self-incrimination means only immunity
from oral testimony has decided this case in accordance with that
doctrine. It is the writer's opinion that this is the better view.
The theory, that the self-incrimination clauses of our constitutions
exclude only oral testimony, admits in evidence facts which may
either substantiate or negate the prosecutor's accusations. The more
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facts that are presented for the jury's consideration the better the
chance of a true evaluation of defendant's probable guilt or inno-
cence. Evidence of blood tests, admitted under the proper statistical
instruction, will lead to the better administration of justice in our
criminal courts.
CHARLES S. BZRNSTZIN.
FIXTURES - Intention as the Controlling Element. The licensee
of the mortgagor, with the verbal consent and approval of the agent
of the mortgagee, erected a four-room house on the mortgaged
land. After decree of foreclosure and order for sale of the premises,
and pending the advertisement of the sale, the building was moved
to adjoining property by the licensee. Mortgagee sought order to
require defendant licensee to move the house back onto the land from
which it came, and was refused. On appeal, HELD, affirmed. A
house built upon mortgaged land does not become a part of the realty
if it is built with the intention of removal if the mortgage is not paid,
all parties assenting to this arrangement; if it is not constructed as
incidental to the operation of the premises for agricultural purposes;
and if the original security given in the mortgage is not thereby im-
paired. Gilbert v. Easterling, 217 S. C. 267, 60 S. E. 2d 595 (1950).
Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit the ancient axiom of law, un-
doubtedly expressed the rule at common law, that whatever is once
annexed to the soil becomes a part of it, and cannot afterwards be
removed except by him who is entitled to the inheritance. King v.
Morris, 74 N. J. L. 810, 68 At. 162 (1907). Where improvements,
which become a part of the freehold are put upon the mortgaged pre-
mises, either by the mortgagor or a purchaser from him, such im-
provements become subject to the lien of the mortgage and constitute
a part of the security for the mortgage debt. Annely v. DeSaussure,
12 S. C. 488 (1879); Heath v. Haile, 45 S. C. 642, 24 S. E. 300
(1896). However, even the apparently rigid common law rule was
not wholly inflexible, as one exception was pointed out in Poole's
Case in 1703, "... during the term the soap boiler might well re-
move the vats he set up in relation to trade, and that he might do
it by the Common Law". That apparent inflexibility of the com-
mon law rule has been further tempered by numerous decisions of
the South Carolina Supreme Court. E. g., Evans v. McLucas, 15
S. C. 810 (1881). So various are the considerations which enter
into the interpretation of the law of fixtures that an adjudicated case
may fail to be any authority, as the particular case must be considered
3
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with reference to the relation of the parties. Montague v. Dent,
10 Rich. L. 135 (S. C. 1856). In modern times the question whether
the article is to be regarded as a fixture depends generally upon the
intention of the parties. Hurst v. Craig Furniture Co., 95 S. C. 221,
78 S. E. 960 (1913). Every case of this type must depend on its
own special and peculiar circumstances. Buckland v. Butterfield, 9
E. C. L. R.; Montague v. Dent, supra. From the leading case of
Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853), as adopted by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Planter's Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin
Co., 132 S. C. 16, 128 S. E. 876 (1925), ". . . the following ele-
ments are necessary to make a chattel a part of the realty: 1. Actual
or constructive annexation to the realty or to something appurtenant
thereto; 2. Appropriation of the chattel to the use or purpose to that
part of the realty with which it is connected; 3. The intention of the
party making the annexation to make the chattel a permanent acces-
sion to the freehold, this intention being inferred from the nature of
the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the
annexation, and the purpose for which the annexation has been
made". And in the same case, quoting Saye v. Hill, 100 S. C. 21,
84 S. E. 307 (1915), "While the manner in which a thing is attached
... may be of some value.. ., it does not afford an absolute or con-
clusive test. The intention with which it is attached is usually a
more controlling factor. Yet all the circumstances should be con-
sidered, especially as they throw light upon the intention. Houses
are frequently built and expensive machinery installed therein, with
every appearance of permanency; yet it is done under a license
from the owner of the soil, or under a lease thereof, and under
agreement for and with the intention of removal at the expiration
of the license or lease. In such cases they are not fixtures." Earlier
the same view was adopted in Hughes v. Edisto Cypress Shingle
Co., 51 S. C. 1, 28 S. E. 2 (1897) and Rawls v. American Central
Insurance Co., 97 S. C. 189, 81 S. E. 505 (1914). In one of several
Alabama cases, substantially in point, and expressing the majority
view in the United States, where a lot-owner, holding subject to a
purchase-money mortgage, agreed that plaintiff might erect a house
on the lot which should not become a fixture, it was held not to im-
pair the mortgage security, nor give the mortgagee any interests in
the house subsequently erected. Roberts v. Caple, 8 Ala. App. 444,
62 So. 343 (1913). Contra: Ekstrom v. Hall, 90 Me. 186, 38 AtI.
106 (1897); Lynde v. Rowe, 94 Mass. 100 (1866). A mortgagee
has no equitable claim to chattel subsequently annexed to realty,
4
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having parted with nothing on the faith of such chattels. Beatrice
Creamery Co. v. Sylvester, 65 Colo. 569, 179 Pac. 154 (1919).
While the South Carolina Court is still hampered in a small mea-
sure by the common law rules, the later cases clearly show that they
are not bound strictly thereby, but merely employ these rules to con-
strue the intention of the parties. Thus, the nature of the article,
the mode of annexation, and even the appropriation of the chattel to
the use of the realty seem less important as more weight is plainly
placed on the intention of the parties. The relationship of the par-
ties is weighty, but even this, only so far as it demonstrates their
intentions. Therefore, we must concede that the intention of the
parties is the primary consideration, and a just one, since more
equitable decisions will be fathered by this test. In the present
case, certainly a highly inequitable result would have been born had
the court followed blindly the strict rules of the common law.
ARTHUR M. ERWIN.
CRUMNAL LAW -EVIDENCE -Effect of Commenting on
Accused's Failure to Testify. After testimony that a heel from the
scene of the crime came from the defendant's shoe, the solicitor
argued that the evidence "is not disputed". The defense contended
this was commenting on the defendant's failure to testify. The trial
judge ruled that the inference was in relation to the evidence of the
shoe heel and refused a motion for mistrial. On appeal, HELD,
affirmed. An indirect reference to an accused's failure to testify
can be cured by a charge that such failure to testify is not to be
considered by the jury. But, if the solicitor makes a direct reference
to an accused's failure to testify, then the trial judge must grant a
mistrial. State v. Wilkens, 217 S. C. 105, 59 S. E. 2d 853 (1950).
The general rule is that it is improper and prejudicial for the
prosecuting attorney, in the course of a trial, to comment on or make
any reference to the fact that the accused did not testify as a wit-
ness in his own behalf. State v. Pendarvis, 88 S. C. 548, 71 S. E.
548 (1911); State v. King, 158 S. C. 251, 155 S. E. 409 (1930).
This right has been conferred by the provision in a great majority of
state constitutions that no person shall be compelled to be a Witness
against himself in a criminal case, e. g., S. C. CONST. ART. I, § 17;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97
(1908). These constitutional rights are further supported by statutes
in a majority of states, e. g., State v. Spivey, 198 N. C. 655, 153
5
Bernstein et al.: Recent Cases
Published by Scholar Commons, 1950
RICMNT CASES
S. R. 254 (1930) ; People v. Forte, 277 N. Y. 440, 14 N. E. 2d 783
(1938). A statute in South Dakota which allowed comment by the
prosecution was held to violate the constitutional right not to testify
against one's self and was therefore invalid. State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D.
178, 266 N. W. 116 (1936). In some states such comment has been
made legal by constitutional amendment. Fross v. Wotton, 3 Cal.
2d 384, 44 P. 2d 350 (1935); Leonard v. State, 100 Ohio 456, 127
N. E. 464 (1919). In South Carolina there is no statute expressly
forbidding this type of comment, however, the S. C. Supreme Court
has stated: "We lay it down as a rule that however innocently done
by a solicitor, or however praiseworthy his motives in so doing, it
is an unwarrantable line of argument". State v. Howard, 35 S. C.
197, 203, 14 S. E. 481 (1892). There are two views as to the action
that should be taken when the prosecution does make the forbidden
comment. 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAi, EvimCzc, § 1128 (11th ed.
1935). The majority view is that although it is improper for a
solicitor to comment upon the defendant's failure to testify, it is not
reversible error if the judge promptly charges the jury that a de-
fendant may testify or not and that no inferences to his prejudice
should result therefrom. State v. Howard, supra. On the other
hand, some courts hold that the remarks by prosecuting officers, as
to failure to testify, made in violation of statute are so prejudicial
that they cannot be cured by instruction to the jury however forcibly
given. Parnell v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. Rep. 507, 27 S. W. 2d 192
(1930) ; Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 98 So. 613 (1924). This minority
view was stated by the Supreme Court of Georgia to be: "A new
trial will be ordered when counsel for the state called attention of
the jury to the failure of the accused to avail himself of the privilege
of making a statement to the jury in his own behalf". Caesar v.
State, 125 Ga. 6, 53 S. E. 815 (1906).
Thus it seems that the law as to the curing effect of the judge's
charge, when the improper comment has been made, is tending to
move away from the majority view. The new view as evidenced by
the dictum in the principal case is one more in keeping with justice.
Under the old rule the state counsel, in order to call the jury's atten-
tion to the fact that the accused has not testified, had only to refer
to that fact without taking the risk of a mistrial. Of course, the jury
will be instructed that the failure to testify is not to raise a presump-
tion against the accused, but will a layman be influenced by words
that in effect say, "You are to judge this issue, and even though it
is logical that an innocent man would want to say he was innocent,
and the solicitor has told you he could have spoken, but you are not
6
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to be logical; you are to erase such reasoning from your mind?"
I do not think the average juror would be influenced by such a charge.
R. E. GRAYSON.
REAL PROPERTY - ESTOPPEL - Scope of Ownership of the
Property Involved. Plaintiff was owner in fee of a parcel of land
over which its railroad operated. Defendant purchased the adjoin-
ing lot and thinking he also owned the railroad's lot erected a house,
fence, and hedge thereon. Seven years later plaintiff discovered
it owned the lot in fee and brought action to require defendant
to remove the improvements made by him. Defendant pleaded title
by estoppel. The jury found for the defendant, not only as to the
portion of the lot actually covered by the improvements, but as to
the entire lot. On appeal, HELD, affirmed. A railroad owning land
in fee upon which the adjoining land owner erects a house within
plain view of the railroad, is estopped to assert its title against such
adjoining landowner as to the entire tract. Piedmont and Northern
Ry. v. Henderson, 216 S. C. 98, 56 S. E. 2d 740 (1949).
Estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying or as-
serting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contempla-
tion of law, been established as the truth, either by acts of judicial
or legislative officers or implied. Southern Ry. v. Day, 140 S. C.
388, 138 S. E. 870 (1926). To render the rule of estoppel opera-
tive it is essential that the party against whom the estoppel is claimed
should have acted with knowledge of his rights, and that he was
aware of the facts in respect of the estoppel claimed; also that the
party invoking the estoppel was misled by the acts or conduct of the
party against whom the estoppel is claimed, that he justifiably
changed his position in reliance thereon, and that he was prejudiced
thereby, or the party against whom the estoppel is claimed benefitted.
Cannon v. Baker, 97 S. C. 116, 81 S. E. 478 (1913). It requires
ten years to confer good title by adverse possession, such possession
must be open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, continuous, and unbroken
for the whole period. Clary v. Bonnett, 114 S. C. 452, 103 S. E.
779 (1920). The time it takes for estoppel to arise or the acquie-
scence thereto is very short. Champ v. Nicholas County Court, 72
W. Va. 475, 78 S. E. 361 (1913). The purpose of estoppel is to
prevent inconsistency and fraud resulting in injustice. Ward v.
Cohen, 3 S. C. 338 (1871). Estoppel may arise where one party
has been induced by the conduct of the other to do or forbear doing
something which he would not or would have done but for such con-
7
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duct of the other party. Bull v. Rowe, 13 S. C. 355 (1879). Es-
toppel to assert one's right to property is provable usually by circum-
stances and may arise from silence. For silence to be estoppel the one
who is silent when conscience requires him to speak shall be debarred
from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent. Nicholas
v. Austin, 82 Va. 817, 1 S. E. 132 (1887). A railroad right of way,
having been acquired for public purposes, can not be lost by pre-
scriptive use or adverse possession, unless by erection of a perma-
nent structure, accompanied by notice of adverse claim. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. v. Searson, 137 S. C. 468, 135 S. R. 567 (1926).
The owner of the fee in a railroad right of way has the right to
use so much of it as is not in the actual use and occupancy of the
railroad company, if not inconsistent with the claim of the right of
way for railroad purposes. Atlantic & Charlotte Air Line Ry. v.
Limestone Globe Land Co., 109 S. C. 444, 96 S. E. 188 (1917).
It is a rule almost of universal application that one who stands by
and sees another purchase land or enter upon it under claim of
right, and permits such other to make expenditures or improvements
under circumstances which would call for notice or protest, can not
afterwards assert his own title against such person. Alabama Great
Southern Ry. v. South & North Alabama Ry., 84 Ala. 570, 3 So.
286 (1887). Where a railroad company has in its possession a deed
to land, it is deemed to have known its own rights and will be es-
topped to say that it did not have knowledge of its rights to posses-
sion. Atlantic & Charlotte Air Line Ry. v. Victor Mfg. Co., 93
S. C. 397, 76 S. E. 1091 (1913). For structures to be such that
they will estop one from claiming the contrary they must be of a
permanent nature. A fence is not of itself permanent enough to cre-
ate estoppel. Harnan v. Southern Ry., 72 S. C. 228, 51 S. E. 689
(1905). A railroad company, knowing that another is erecting per-
manent improvements on its right of way, and does not object, is
estopped from afterwards asserting its rights to so much of its ease-
ment as is occupied by such improvements. Columbia, Newberry &
Laurens Ry. v. Laurens Cotton Mills, 82 S. C. 24, 61 S. E. 1089
(1908).
Perhaps no other technical legal term is more loosely used than
the term "estoppel". It is used sometimes merely to indicate the
existence of an ordinary prior paramount right in the opposite party
or a general rule of law, but more specifically it is a creature of the
law without which injustice would often triumph. That would truly
have been the result here if estoppel had not come into play. To
say, in this case, that even though the plaintiff was estopped it was
8
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to the extent only as to so much of its easement as was occupied
by such improvements would be saying that the defendant erected
the residence upon the belief that they only owned such of the land
as it covered. As the Court said, "There is little, if any, apparent
logic in that and no precedent has been found for it". It seems
that the principle set out in this case has always been with us; how-
ever, it has not -been applied until now because the circumstances
have' not demanded it. Since without adjacent land for ingress,
egress, and repair, property would be of little or no value, the de-
•cision reached by the Court in the present case is equitable and ideal.
MALCOLM E. RENTZ.
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - Search In-
cident to Arrest. Upon reliable information that the defendant pos-
sessed large quantities of forged stamps and had sold some. to a
postal employee, Federal officials, armed with a valid warrant for
,defendant's arrest, arrested him in his place of business, a small
one room office open to the public. They then searched, without a
search warrant, his desk, safe, and filing cabinets in which. they
found a number of stamps. This evidence was admitted over de-
fendant's objection in the trial of the case which resulted in his
couyiction. The court of appeals reversed the conviction on the
-ground that the search was illegal since the officers had ample time
to obtain a search warrant. On appeal, HELD, three justices dis-
senting, reversed. Trupiano v. U. S., 334 U. S. 699, 68 Sup. Ct.
1.129, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (1948) overruled. The search was lawful
,as an incident to a legal arrest and the arrest was lawful because
the officers had probable cause to believe that a felony was being
committed in their presence. U. S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 70
Sup. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 407 (1950).
. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
,papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U. S.
,CoNST. AMEND. IV. The troublesome problem is what constitutes
i'unreasonable searches and seizures". The complexity of the prob-
lem and the uncertainty are clearly shown by the 5-4 decision in
Trupiano v. U. S., supra, and the 5-3 decision in the present case.
The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute
terms, Harris v. U. S., 331 U. S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed.
9
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1399 (1947), but must find resolution in the facts and circumstances
of each case. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344, 51
Sup. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931). The arrest must be lawful
with a warrant or with a probable cause to believe that a felony has
been committed. U. S. v. Lindenfeld, 142 F. 2d 829 (C.C.A. 9th
1944) ; S/iew v. U. S., 155 F. 2d 628 (C.C.A. 4th 1946). The search
must be contemporaneous with the arrest. Agnello v, U. S, 269
U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925). The right to search
the person of a prisoner following a lawful arrest, and to seize from
him articles connected with the crime is well settled. Garske v. U. S.,.
1 F. 2d 620 (C.C.A. 8th 1924) ; U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452,
52 Sup. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932). From this point there-seems
to be a transition towards enlarging the right to search incident to
lawful arrest. It has been held that the warrant of' arrest carries
with it authority to seize all that is on the person, or in such immedi-
ate physical relation to -the one arrested as to be in a fair. sense a
projection of his person. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U. S., supra;
U.. S. v. Lefkowitz, supra. It seems well settled also that there is
a right to seize visible evidence of crime and to search the person
arrested and even objects he physically controls. Carroll v. U. S.
267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); Week.F V.
U. S.; 232 U. -S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914). This
right was expanded in Agnello v. U. S., supra, which held that irr
addition to -the right to search persons lawfully arrested, there was
a right to search the premises under the control of the person, where.
the arrest is made in order to find and seize. things connected with
the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed,
as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody.
The authority of officers to search and seize the things used to carry
on the criminal enterprise extended to all parts of the premises used
for the lawful purpose. Harris v. U. S., supra; Matron v. U. S.,
275 U. S. 192, 48 Sup. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927). Some Federal
courts hold that only the fruits and evidences of the particular crime
may be seized. Marron v. U. S., supra; Takahashi v. U. S., 143 F.
2d 118 (C.C.A. 9th 1944); Kelly v. U. S., 61 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 8th
1932). Others, who seem in the minority, hold that fruits and in-
strumentalities of any crime may be seized. Gouled z. U. S., 255
U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921); U. S. v. Strick-
land, 62 F. Supp. 468 (W. D. S. C. 1945). The search of vehicles
and vessels without a warrant was approved in Carroll v. U. S., supra,
on the grounds that the vehicles or vessels are of such a mobile nature
that they could be moved out of the jurisdiction before the warrant
10
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could be obtained. In accord, Husty v. U. S., 282 U. S. 694, 51 Sup.
Ct. 89, 75 L. Ed. 740 (1931) ; Scher v. U. S. 305 U. S. 251, 59 Sup.
Ct. 174, 83 L. Ed. 151 (1938).
From a reading of the cases cited above, the court seems to be
faced with two problems in deciding the cases. The first is whether
to follow the policy of protecting the individual's civil rights guaran-
teed by thb Constitution. The second is whether to follow the policy
of providing for an efficient law enforcement system. Perhaps the
weight that the particular judge places on one of these policies ac-
counts for the seemingly inconsistent results reached and for the
dissents, "usually by the same judges. Of course, both should be
adhered to in so far as possible, but the point where they diverge
is the point where the problems prise. It seems that the rule in
Trupiano V. U. S, 'supra, which provides that a search without a
warrant violates the Fourth Amendment where the arresting officers
had time -to secure a search warrant, and the need for a search was
apparent prior to the arrest, is the better rule. It seems clear in
the instant case that the obtaining of a search warrant would not
have, been' detrimental, to effective law enforcement: The officers
had 'knowledge ,of .the defendant's; unlawful dealings for sixteen
days before the arrest and they had knowledge of the nature of the
instrum~ftt.lities involved. Surely thi was an adequate time in which
to obtain a search warrant. It seems equallyclear that no legal yard-
stick may be laid down and that each case must be decided on its.,
Own facts and circumstances in determining -whether the search was
reasonable or unreasonable.
H. P. SmtaH.
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